Cases Covered:
Marbury v. Madison was the first time the Supreme Court declared something "unconstitutional", and established the concept of judicial review in the U.S. (the idea that courts may oversee and nullify the actions of another branch of government). The landmark decision helped define the "checks and balances" of the American form of government.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case decided on March 20, 1816. It was the first case to assert ultimate Supreme Court authority over state courts in matters of federal law.
Story first confronted the argument that Federal Judicial power came from the states, and therefore that the Supreme Court had no right to overrule a state's interpretation of the treaty without its consent. Story found that it was clear from history and the preamble of the Constitution that the Federal power was given directly by the people and not by the States. Story then cited Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 2, stating that "in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction" showed a textual commitment to allow Supreme Court review of state decisions. If the Supreme Court could not review decisions from the highest State court, the State courts would be excluded from ever hearing a case in any way involving a Federal question, because the Supreme Court would be deprived of appellate jurisdiction in those cases. Thus, because it was established that the States had the power to rule on Federal issues it must be true that the Supreme Court can review the decision or the Supreme Court would not have appellate jurisdiction in "all other cases." Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause declares that the Federal interpretation will trump the State's interpretation.
Story then quickly rejected concerns over State Judicial sovereignty. The Supreme court could already review state executive and legislative decisions and this case was no different. Story then confronted the arguments that State Judges were bound to uphold the Constitution just as Federal judges were, and so denying state interpretations presumed that the State Judges would less than faithfully interpret the Constitution. Story countered that even if State Judges were not biased, the issue was not bias but uniformity in Federal law. Furthermore, the legislative power to remove a case to Federal court would be inadequate for maintaining this uniformity. Finally, Story applied these principles of Judicial review to the decisions below and found that the state court's decision was in error.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)[1], was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which held that the states were bound by the Court's decisions, and could not choose to ignore them.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that retreated from the Court's political question doctrine, deciding that reapportionment (attempts to change the way voting districts are delineated) issues present justiciable questions, thus enabling federal courts to intervene in and to decide reapportionment cases. The defendants unsuccessfully argued that reapportionment of legislative districts is a "political question", and hence not a question that may be resolved by federal courts.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gibbons. The sole argued source of Congress's power to promulgate the law at issue was the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the Court had to answer whether the law regulated "commerce" that was "among the several states." With respect to "commerce," the Court held that commerce is more than mere traffic—that it is the trade of commodities—it is also intercourse. This broader definition includes navigation. The Court interpreted "among" as "intermingled with."
Marshall's ruling determined that "a Congressional power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce'."
The Court went on to conclude that Congressional power over commerce should extend to the regulation of all aspects of it, overriding state law to the contrary:
"If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States."
1 (1824): J. Marshall; Held state statute granting steamboat monopoly for steamboat, which traveled between two states unconstitutional.
a) Laid down broad, modern conception of C.C. –
(1) What is interstate commerce?
· Not merely the buying and selling; it includes “every species of commercial intercourse.” (Definition is inclusive enough to cover navigation).
(2) What is the extent of the power to regulate it?
· Congress’s power is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution.”
(3) What is the effect on the states of this grant of power to Congress? (Dormant commerce clause)
· Put off this issue; sidestepped issue of greatest controversy
b) Significance: Allowed for broad national power under C.C. as augmented by N&P, while leaving the power over internal commerce to the States. BUT, at this point the fact that the activity being regulated was ECONOMIC was assumed.
c) Note: Didn’t resolve the “dormant c.c.” issue – the validity of state regulations of local matters that were potentially subject to federal regulation under the CC and NP Clause.
The court held "that the result of the transaction was the creation of a monopoly in the manufacture of a necessity of life" but ruled that it "could not be suppressed under the provisions of the act". The court ruled that manufacturing—in this case, refining—was a local activity not subject to congressional regulation of interstate commerce. Fuller wrote:
That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State. . . . Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but . . . affects it only incidentally and indirectly.
Under the Knight decision, any action against manufacturing monopolies would need to be taken by individual states, making such regulation extremely difficult with regards to out-of-state monopolies because states are prohibited from discriminating against out-of-state goods by, among other things, the Dormant Commerce Clause and Article I section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. The ruling prevailed until the end of the 1930s, when the court took a different position on the national government's power to regulate the economy.
Justice Day, for the majority, said that Congress does not have the power to regulate commerce of goods that are manufactured by children, and that the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 was therefore unconstitutional. Drawing a distinction between the manufacture of goods and the regulation of certain goods themselves "inherently evil", the Court maintained that the issue did not concern the power to keep certain immoral products out of the stream of interstate commerce, distinguishing previous cases upholding Congress's power to control lottery schemes, prostitution, and liquor. The Court reasoned that, in those cases, the goods themselves were inherently immoral and thus open to congressional scrutiny. In this case, however, the issue at hand was the manufacture of cotton, a good whose use is not immoral. The Court further held that the manufacture of cotton did not in itself constitute interstate commerce. The Court recognized that disparate labor regulations placed the various states on unequal ground in terms of economic competitiveness, but it specifically stated that Congress could not address such inequality, for it was within the right of states to enact differing laws within the scope of their police powers:
It is further contended that the authority of Congress may be exerted to control interstate commerce in the shipment of childmade goods because of the effect of the circulation of such goods in other states where the evil of this class of labor has been recognized by local legislation, and the right to thus employ child labor has been more rigorously restrained than in the state of production. In other words, that the unfair competition, thus engendered, may be controlled by closing the channels of interstate commerce to manufacturers in those states where the local laws do not meet what Congress deems to be the more just standard of other states. The grant of power of Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the states in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture.
"The commerce clause was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions," the court reasoned. The Court added that the federal government was "one of enumerated powers" and could not go beyond the boundary drawn by the 10th Amendment:
In our view the necessary effect of this act is, by means of a prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary commercial commodities to regulate the hours of labor of children in factories and mines within the states, a purely state authority. Thus the act in a two-fold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also exerts a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend.
Dissent: Justice Holmes dissented strongly from the logic and ruling of the majority. He maintained that Congress was completely within its right to regulate interstate commerce, and that goods manufactured in one state and sold in other states were by definition interstate commerce. This places the entire manufacturing process under the purview of Congress, and this constitutional power "could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic policy of any State." (Ibid) Holmes also took issue with the majority's logic in allowing Congress to regulate goods themselves regarded as immoral, while at the same time disallowing regulation of goods whose use may be considered just as immoral in a more indirect sense: "The notion that prohibition is any less prohibition when applied to things now thought evil I do not understand...to say that it is permissible as against strong drink but not as against the product of ruined lives." (Ibid)
Subsequent developments: The ruling of the Court was later overturned and repudiated in a series of decisions handed down in the late 1930s. Specifically, Hammer v. Dagenhart was overruled in 1941 in the case of United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court in the Darby case sided strongly with Holmes' dissent, which they named "classic". They also recast the reading of the 10th Amendment, regarding it as a "truism" that merely restates what the Constitution had already provided for, rather than offering a substantive protection to the States, as the Hammer ruling had contended
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote the majority opinion in the case, which reversed the lower court's ruling in a 5-4 decision. Per Justice Hughes: "Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (abbreviated as FLSA; also referred to as the Wages and Hours Bill) is a federal statute of the United States. The FLSA established a national minimum wage, guaranteed 'time-and-a-half' for overtime in certain jobs, and prohibited most employment of minors in "oppressive child labor," a term that is defined in the statute. It applies to employees engaged in interstate commerce or employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, unless the employer can claim an exemption from coverage.
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, holding that the U.S. Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions. The unanimous decision of the Court in this case overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and limited the application of Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
At issue was whether the Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority in creating the Fair Labor Standards Act. An American lumber company in Georgia that did not meet these standards was charged with violating the law, but had won an appeal, where the appellate judge found that the federal government is barred by the 10th Amendment from interfering in matters that are strictly local, that is, within intrastate boundaries. The Act also required the keeping of records to verify compliance; the appellee argued that this violated his 5th Amendment right protecting him from self-incrimination.
The Court reversed the appellate court decision. It affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which power "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." FindLaw. The Court held that the purpose of the Act was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage through interstate commerce. In the Dagenhart case, the Court had made the distinction between manufacturing and interstate commerce, so that a business could argue it was engaging in the former, but had not intended the latter. Twenty-two years later, the Court found that earlier argument facile, explaining that Congress was well aware that businesses produce their goods without thought to where it will go; product is pulled and shipped to meet the orders of the day. The Court also found that the requirement of record keeping was entirely appropriate as a matter of enforcing the Act.
United States v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995) was the first United States Supreme Court case since the New Deal to set limits to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was a 12th grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas. On March 10, 1992 he carried a concealed .38 caliber revolver, along with five bullets, into the school. He was confronted by school authorities and admitted to having the weapon. The next day, he was charged with violation of the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)[4]
Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that §922(q) of the Act was "unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools." The trial court denied the motion, ruling that §922(q) was "a constitutional exercise of Congress' well defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce."
Lopez was tried and convicted. He appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that §922(q) exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that "section 922(q), in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause."
The Government petitioned for Supreme Court review and the Court accepted the case.
To sustain the Act, the Government was obligated to show that §922(q) was a valid exercise of the Congressional Commerce Clause power, i.e. that the section regulated a matter which "affected" (or "substantially affected") interstate commerce.
The Government's principal argument was that the possession of a firearm in an educational environment would most likely lead to a violent crime, which in turn would affect the general economic condition in two ways. First, because violent crime causes harm and creates expense, it raises insurance costs, which are spread throughout the economy; and second, by limiting the willingness to travel in the area perceived to be unsafe. The Government also argued that the presence of firearms within a school would be seen as dangerous, resulting in students' being scared and disturbed; this would, in turn, inhibit learning; and this, in turn, would lead to a weaker national economy since education is clearly a crucial element of the nation's financial health.
The Court, however, found these arguments to create a dangerous slippery slope: what would prevent the federal government from then regulating any activity that might lead to violent crime, regardless of its connection to interstate commerce, because it imposed social costs? What would prevent Congress from regulating any activity that might bear on a person's economic productivity?
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that while Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, the power was limited, and did not extend so far from "commerce" as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns, especially when there was no evidence that carrying them affected the economy on a massive scale.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, identified the three broad categories of activity that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause:
· the channels of interstate commerce,
· the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, and
· activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce
The Court summarily dismissed any consideration of the first two categories and concluded that the resolution of the case depended only on consideration of the third category—regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Court essentially concluded that in no way was the carrying of handguns a commercial activity or even related to any sort of economic enterprise, even under the most extravagant definitions.
The opinion rejected the government's argument that because crime negatively impacted education Congress might have reasonably concluded that crime in schools substantially affects commerce.
The Court reasoned that if Congress could regulate something so far removed from commerce, then it could regulate anything, and since the Constitution clearly creates Congress as a body with enumerated powers, this could not be so. Rehnquist concluded:
“To uphold the Government's contentions here, we have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.”
The Court specifically looked to four factors in determining whether legislation represents a valid effort to use the Commerce Clause power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce:
1. Whether the activity was non-economic as opposed to economic activity; previous cases involved economic activity.
2. Jurisdictional element: whether the gun had moved in interstate commerce.
3. Whether there had been Congressional findings of an economic link between guns and education.
4. How attenuated the link was between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.
It is important to note that although the ruling stopped a decades-long trend of inclusiveness under the commerce clause, it did not reverse any past ruling about the meaning of the clause. Later, Rehnquist stated that the Court had the duty to prevent the legislative branch from usurping state powers over policing the conduct of their citizens. He admitted that the Supreme Court had upheld certain governmental steps towards taking power away from the states, and cited Lopez as a decision that finally stepped in to check the government's authority by defining clearly between state and federal powers.
Lopez raised serious questions as to how far the Court might be willing to go in implementing judicial safeguards against federal encroachments on state sovereignty.[24] This precedent takes special significance in cases where the federal government is attempting to limit private conduct.[24] Commentators are still postulating its possible effects on other established federal laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Power, such as the Clean Water Act. The argument can be made that this significant limiting of federal power is necessary to establish a greater threshold for governmental accountability and revitalizes the role of the states in public policymaking
United States v. Morrison invalidated the section of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 that gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court, although program funding remains unaffected. Congress enacted this private civil remedy because of what the minority called a mountain of data suggesting that states did not prosecute crimes against women as often as crimes against men.
The Court majority ruled that VAWA exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The Court, relying on United States v. Lopez, rejected the argument that VAWA was validly enacted under the Commerce Clause's grant of power to Congress. The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had the power to enact VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment, relying on the "state action" doctrine. This doctrine, which originated in United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, provides that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment do not constrain private individuals.
Justice Souter, however, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that enacting VAWA was well within congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and stated that the majority was reviving an old and discredited interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that it was primarily the responsibility of Congress, and not the courts, to put limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer contended that Congress had been sensitive to concerns of federalism in enacting VAWA, and expressed doubts about the majority's pronouncements on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Morrison, like Kimel and Garrett, was part of a series of Rehnquist Court decisions from 1999 through 2001 holding that state sovereignty limits various federal civil rights laws.
Commerce Clause: With regard to the Commerce Clause, the majority said that the result was controlling by United States v. Lopez (1995), which had held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional. There as in Morrison, the Court stressed "enumerated powers" that limit federal power in order to maintain "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Lopez therefore limited the scope of the Commerce Clause to exclude activity that was not directly economic in nature, even if there were indirect economic consequences. Lopez was the first significant limitation on the Commerce Clause powers of Congress in 53 years.
The majority concluded that acts of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce. The government, however, argued that "a mountain of evidence" indicated that these acts in the aggregate did have a substantial effect; for this proposition it relied on Wickard v. Filburn (1942), which held that Congress could regulate an individual act that lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce if, when aggregated, acts of that sort had the required relation to interstate commerce. Once again relying on Lopez, the majority replied that the aggregation principle of Wickard did not apply because economic effects of crimes against women were indirect, and therefore could not be addressed through the Commerce Clause.
The Court explained that the need to distinguish between economic activities that directly and those that indirectly affect interstate commerce was due to "the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority." Referring to Lopez, the Court said: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional State concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and State authority would blur." The majority further stated, "[I]t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also expressed the concern that "Congress [was] appropriating State police powers under the guise of regulating commerce."
The majority, quoting from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), said that the scope of the interstate commerce power
“ must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government. ”
The Lopez court stated that Congress may regulate (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the "instrumentalities" (for example, vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the Morrison court analyzed its validity under the third.
Equal Protection Clause: The United States Government argued that pervasive gender stereotypes and assumptions permeated state justice systems. It argued these forms of state bias led to "insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence." This bias, the government argued, deprived women of the equal protection of the laws, and the private civil remedy of VAWA was meant to redress "both the States' bias and deter future instances of gender discrimination in the state courts."
The Court responded that, even if there had been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities in this case, precedents such as the Civil Rights Cases limit the manner in which Congress may remedy discrimination, and require that a civil remedy be directed at a State or state actor instead of a private party. Such precedents, said the Court, prohibit only state action — i.e., action by state governments — and not private conduct. In other words, unequal enforcement of state laws caused by inaction is, by this interpretation, beyond the scope of the federal government's enforcement of the equal protection clause.
The majority reaffirmed the state action doctrine, and specifically reaffirmed the results reached in United States v. Harris (1883) and the Civil Rights Cases (1883), both decided fifteen years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause applied only to acts done by states, not to acts done by private individuals. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to racial discrimination in private establishments, the Court said in the Civil Rights Cases, it exceeded congressional enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Harris, the Court ruled that the Clause did not apply to a prison lynching, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to private actors, as opposed to state actors. A sheriff (a state actor) had tried to prevent the lynching.
According to Morrison, "assuming that there has been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities in this case, it would not be enough to save § 13981's civil remedy, which is directed not at a State or state actor but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias." The Court agreed with the government that there was a "voluminous congressional record" supporting the "assertion that there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence," and the Court also agreed with the government that "state-sponsored gender discrimination violates equal protection unless it serves important governmental objectives...." However, according to the majority, even if there is unconstitutional state action, that only justifies Congress in targeting the state actors, rather than targeting private parties.
The government's argument was that VAWA was in response to "gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities" and that there was "no indication of such state action" in the Civil Rights Cases. According to the Court, however the Civil Rights Cases held that the Equal Protection Clause could not prohibit unequal enforcement of state laws. To support this interpretation of the Civil Rights Cases, the Court quoted one of the Congressmen who had supported the law that the Civil Rights Cases struck down: "There were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves." To the majority, this quote indicated that the law deemed unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases was meant to combat the same kind of disparate treatment against which VAWA was aimed.
The majority continued that even if the government's distinction between Morrison and the Civil Rights Cases was valid, the VAWA still was unconstitutionally aimed not at state actors but at private criminal conduct. The Court's City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) interpretation of Katzenbach v. Morgan, the majority stated, required that Congress adhere to the Court's state action interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "congruence and proportionality" requirement of Boerne did not allow Congress to exceed the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the "one way ratchet" interpretation of Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) would have allowed Congress to go beyond, but not fall short of, the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,[3] that interpretation had been rejected by the Court in Boerne in order to prevent "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority" (the Boerne Court cited arguments made by 19th century "Democrats and conservative Republicans" as they opposed a preliminary draft of the Fourteenth Amendment).
In the case of Morgan, the Court had said that the Equal Protection Clause is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees," which some interpreted as an acknowledgment by the Court of congressional power to expand the rights contained in section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Boerne Court said, "This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one." The Court in Boerne said that only the Court could interpret the Constitution, in order to maintain the "traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary." Professor Jim Chen, then of the University of Minnesota (now law dean at the University of Louisville), has said that while Boerne did not formally overrule Morgan, "after Boerne, Morgan will never again enjoy iconic status."[4] The Morrison Court distinguished Morgan, which had involved federal legislation "directed at New York officials" instead of private parties. The Morrison Court also noted that, unlike the VAWA, the legislation in Morgan "was directed only to the State where the evil found by Congress existed."
The United States has a federal structure, with power divided between the states and the federal government. The state governments can act in any sphere not prohibited to them (10th Amendment, U.S. Constitution) but the federal government can pass laws only in areas specifically delegated to it (Art. I, U.S. Constitution). The state governments have general police power. The federal government does not have general police power and is a government body of limited, enumerated powers granted by the Constitution. Consequently, a substantial amount of U.S. federal law regulating numerous areas, including economic legislation and criminal law, are legally premised on an exercise of the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause, along with the Fourteenth Amendment and the spending power, allows Congress to do things that affect states.
The Controlled Substances Act does not recognize the medical use of marijuana. Agents from the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) were assigned to break up California's medical marijuana co-ops and seize their assets. This activity was the result of the belief that federal law preempted that of California. The government argued that if a single exception were made to the Controlled Substances Act, it would become unenforceable in practice. The government also contended that consuming one's locally grown marijuana for medical purposes affects the interstate market of marijuana, and hence that the federal government may regulate—and prohibit—such consumption. This argument stems from the landmark New Deal case Wickard v. Filburn, which held that the government may regulate personal cultivation and consumption of crops, due to the effect of that consumption on interstate commerce, however minute it may be.
The relevant precedents for it are Wickard v. Filburn (1942), United States v. Lopez (1995) and United States v. Morrison (2000).
The starting point for the Court's opinion was the fact that it was conceded that Congress had the power to control or ban marijuana for non-medical uses:
Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress' commerce power. Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority. Rather, respondents' challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA's categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.
Banning the growing of marijuana for medical use, the Court reasoned, was a permissible way of preventing or limiting access to marijuana for other uses:
“Even respondents acknowledge the existence of an illicit market in marijuana; indeed, Raich has personally participated in that market, and Monson expresses a willingness to do so in the future. More concretely, one concern prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home consumption in the 1938 Act was that rising market prices could draw such wheat into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices. Wickard, 317 U.S., at 128. The parallel concern making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market. While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial transactions in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity”
Scalia's opinion: Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence that aimed to differentiate the decision from the more recent results of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. Although Scalia voted in favor of limits on the Commerce Clause in the Lopez and Morrison decisions, he said that his understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause caused him to vote for the Commerce Clause with Raich for the following reason:
“ Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective. As Lopez itself states, and the Court affirms today, Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so “could … undercut” its regulation of interstate commerce. ... This is not a power that threatens to obliterate the line between “what is truly national and what is truly local.”
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852),[1] was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania law requiring all ships entering or leaving Philadelphia to hire a local pilot did not violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Those who did not comply with the law had been required to pay a fee. "It is the opinion of a majority of the court that the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the States of power to regulate pilots, and that although Congress had legislated on this subject, its legislation manifests an intention, with a single exception, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to the several states," wrote Justice Curtis for the majority.
Facts
A 1789 Act of Congress provided that the pilots of ships in the interior waters of the United States would continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the states, or with laws enacted by the states in the future, until Congress provided otherwise through legislation. In 1803 Pennsylvania enacted a law requiring ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to engage a local pilot to guide them through the harbor and imposed a penalty for noncompliance.
The Board of Wardens (P) brought an action against Cooley for violating the Pennsylvania law. Cooley asserted that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional in light of the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). He argued that Congress’ commerce power gave it exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce and Congress could not delegate or confer that authority to the States. The magistrate found for the plaintiff and the Court of Common Pleas and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
1. Does the Commerce Clause deprive the States of all power to regulate interstate commerce such that Congress may not confer such power on the States through legislation?
2. In what ways may the states regulate interstate commerce notwithstanding Congress’ exclusive authority to regulate it under the Constitution?
Holding and Rule
1. No. The Commerce Clause does not deprive the States of all power to regulate interstate commerce such that Congress may not confer such power on the States through legislation.
2. States may regulate those aspects of interstate commerce that are so local in character as to require diverse treatment.
States may regulate matters which, because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress under the Commerce Clause. While the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce including the regulation of pilots, it does not deprive the States of all power to regulate them. Congress has manifested legislative intent not to regulate in this area, and leaves such regulation to the States.
Disposition
Judgment for Board of Wardens affirmed.
The "Dormant" Commerce Clause, also known as the "Negative" Commerce Clause, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states." The idea behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is that this grant of power implies a negative converse — a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. The restriction is self-executing and applies even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.
The premise of the doctrine is that the U.S. Constitution reserves for the United States Congress at least some degree of exclusive power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" (Article I, § 8). Therefore, individual states are limited in their ability to legislate on such matters. The Dormant Commerce Clause does not expressly exist in the text of the United States Constitution. It is, rather, a doctrine deduced by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts from the actual Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Justice O'Connor has written that: The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)[1], was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that states could not discriminate against another state's articles of commerce.
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)
Dames & Moore v. Regan
Ex parte Quirin
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
INS v. Chadha
Clinton v. New York
Bowsher v. Synar
Morrison v. Olson
United States v. Nixon
Clinton v. Jones
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
Slaughter-House Cases
Saenz v. Roe
Duncan v. Louisiana
Lochner v. New York
Nebbia v. New York
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.
Kelo v. City of New London
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell
Griswold v. Connecticut
Roe v. Wade
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey
v. Carhart
Lawrence v. Texas
Washington v. Glucksberg
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)
Loving v. Virginia
Washington v. Davis
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Grutter v. Bollinger
Gratz v. Bollinger
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I)
Craig v. Boren
United States v. Virginia
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
Romer v. Evans
Railway Express Agency v. New York
U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15
Reynolds v. Sims
Davis v. Bandemer
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
Civil Rights Cases
Shelley v. Kraemer
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. United States v. Guest
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Katzenbach v. Morgan
City of Boerne v. Flores
United States v. Morrison 2
Schenck v. United States
Abrams v. United States
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten
Gitlow v. New York
Whitney v. California
Dennis v. United States
Brandenburg v. Ohio
Cohen v. California
Feiner v. New York
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
Virginia v. Black
Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California
Miller v. California
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island
United States v. O'Brien
Texas v. Johnson
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
Connick v. Myers
Near v. Minnesota
New York Times Co. v. United States [The Pentagon Papers Case]
NAACP v. Alabama
Shelton v. Tucker
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.
NAACP v. Button
Buckley v. Valeo
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n
Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life
Branzburg v. Hayes
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
Locke v. Davey
Sherbert v. Verner
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith
Zorach v. Clauson
Lee v. Weisman
Edwards v. Aguillard
Lynch v. Donnelly
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky
Van Orden v. Perry
Everson v. Board of Education
Mueller v. Allen
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
